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IN IBE SUPREMt: COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
' 
-------------------------------------------
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
vs. 
ROBERT W. BOWEN, ) 
Defendant-Respondent ) 
Case No. 16913 
-------------------------------------------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent was charged by an accusation filed by a 
Weber County Grand Jury on or about December 27, 1979, stating 
that the respondent had been convicted of a misdemeanor 
involving moral turpitude or malfeasance in office. The 
accusation was made under the provisions of Section 77-7-1 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, seeking to have the 
respondent removed from office as Weber County Commissioner. 
As of July 1, 1980, while this case was on appeal, Title 77 of 
the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, was repealed with-
out an express saving clause of any kind. Laws, 1980 Chapter 
15 Section 1. A Utah Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted, 
Laws 1980, Chapter 15, Section 2, with provisions extensively 
changed and modified. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On January 21, 1980, the Honorable A. H. Ellett, 
Sitting as a District Judge of the Second Judicial District 
Court at Ogden, Utah, dismissed the accusation of the Weber 
County grand jury. The dismissal was pursuant to the 
respondent's written objection to the accusation, and upon a 
Court hearing and factual inquiry disclosing that there was no 
evidence whatsoever in the record to justify the accusation. 
This case is an appeal by the appellant of that 
order of dismissal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks that the Court affirm the order of 
dismissal made by the District Court or enter its own order of 
dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An Administrative hearing determined that the 
respondent had received unemployment insurance benefits by 
reason of false misrepresentations or statements or of failure 
to report a material fact. Under Section 35-4-5(e) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended, the respondent was subj,ected to 
the administrative remedies provided for, including the pay 
back of all benefits. received. Subsequently, he was charged 
with misrepresentation under Section 35-4-19(a) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended, was tried for a misdemeanor in 
Circuit Court, and was convicted. 
-2-
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On or about December 27th, a Weber County grand jury 
charged the respondent by accusation under 77-7-1 Utah Codl' 
Annotated (1953) as amended, of having been convicted of a 
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or malfeasance in 
off ice. At a hearing of the District Court on or about 
January 21, 1980, the Court determined that the offense charg-
ed had occurred prior to the election and entry of the respon-
dent to public office on or about January 1, 1979. On the 
written objection of the respondent, the Court dismissed the 
acusations stating its reason for so doing in a memorandum 
decision that there was no evidence whatsoever in the record 
to justify the accusation. He clearly indicated that there 
was no evidentiary showing before the Grand Jury to support 
the accusation of any wrong doing subsequent to entering 
office on or about January l, 1979, and that the proceeding 
should be dismissed. The trial judge as the executor of our 
laws so ruled. The State has appealed that decision. While 
that decision has been on appeal, the 1980 legislature has 
repealed the statutory provisions under which the accusation 
was brought. 
ARGUMENT 
The appellant claims a right to have the respondent 
removed from office for having been convicted of a misdemeanor 
involving moral turpitude even if committed before the term of 
off ice or even without any connection with the official duties 
or reflection on that off ice. It finds this claim in former 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
section 77-7-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended. The 
simple answer to this assertion is that Section 77-7-1 has 
been repealed by laws of Utah, 1980 Chapter 15, Section 1, 
effective July 1, 1980. As stated in State ex rel Bennett et 
al vs. Brown, 12 NW 2d 180, S. Ct. Minn. (1943), 
••• on appeal there must be a substantial and 
real controversy between the parties before a 
case will be considered by this Court. The 
principle is well established that where, as 
here, a suit is founded on a statute and such 
statute is repealed, without a saving clause, 
before conclusion of the suit, the suit must 
end where the repeal finds it. P. 181. 
The appeal comes from an Order of Dismissal in the 
District Court. 
There is no express saving clause in the Repealing 
Act. Laws, 1980, Chapter 15, Section 1 simply states that 
Title 77 Utah Code Annotated (1953) is repealed. However, the 
legislative intent regarding the repeal should be determined 
by considering the nature of Title 77 and the subsequent 
enactment of Section 2 of Chapter 15 which is the Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure. No legislative intent to apply a general 
saving clause should be made against the general rule that 
statutory changes in procedure have irrnnediate applicability. 
If a statutory change is primarily procedural, it will take 
precedence over prior law. The U •. S. Supreme Court has stated 
that "the general saving clause does not ordinarly preserve 
discarded remedies or procedures". Warden vs. Marrero, 417 
U.S. 653, (1974) Ut 661. 
-4-
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Recognizing that cases will arise in which it may 
fairly be said that a statutory change both alters .1 penalty 
and modifies a procedure, a Court may inquire into the predom-
inent purpose of the change - - procedural modification or 
penal reassessment to determinte whether such a statute 
applies to all proceedings pending at its effective date. 
U. S. v Blue Sea Line 553 F2d 445, C.A. 5 (1977) U.S. vs. 
Mechem, 509 F 2d 1193, CAlO (1975). 
By enacting the new code of criminal procedure, 
Title 77, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, 
the legis la tu re has not changed the sanction. 
removal from office, but it has completely 
procedure. Under Utah law, County officers are 
It is still 
changed the 
subject to 
removal from office for cause and in a manner as provided by 
law, for high crimes and misdemeanors or malfeasance in 
office. Utah constitution (1896) Art VI Sections 19 and 21 
and Section 77-6-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended. A 
comparison of the former 77-7-1 will show that the present 
statute 77-6-1, is not a substantial re-enactment of the 
statute under which the respondent is charged. The current 
enactment does not contemplate a requirement of a prior 
conviction for crime, nor does it provide for any forefeiture 
of office as a collateral effect of a conviction. It does 
significantly reduce the state's burden of proof improving the 
means of enforcing sanctions. 
It contemplates a cause of action against an offer 
for acts of malfeasance or acts involving a high degree of 
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culpability so as to be nearly allied and equal in guilt to 
felony or other attrocious crime, and punishable in such a 
degree. cf. State vs. Knapp 6 Conn 415 S. Ct. of Errors, Conn 
(1827). 
It is doubtful that the law under 77-7-1 was differ-
ent, and the new enactment is reflective of legislative intent 
at all times. From State vs. Jones 407 P2d 571 S. Ct. Utah 
(1965), it is clear that even moral turpitude and public out-
rage are matters of degree. The term "high crime" includes 
such moral turpitude, or is so offensive as necessary to set 
the term apart from offenses which are obviously not included 
with robbery, larceny, embezzlement, " murder, arson, 
rape, burglary, and many other atrocious crimes and felonies 
not to be mentioned among Christians. To which of these 
horrid crimes are the acts in question nearly allied or equal 
in guilt?" State vs. Knapp, supra, P 418. 
The acts alleged by the accusation in this case are 
punishable by a fine of not less than $50. 00 nor more than 
$250. 00 or by imprisonment for not more than 60 days, or by 
both fine and imprisonment. Section 35-4-19 (a) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended. These acts as alleged nowhere 
near approach the degree necessary for "high crimes and mis-
demeanors". The new statute is entirely procedural dealing 
with manner, mode and degree of proof of high crimes and mis-
demeanors or malfeasance ·in office. The old statute did no 
more, but in a different manner, mode and degree. The statute 
is procedural; the statute in the accusation is repealed; 
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and absent any other legislative intent, procedural changes 
:1rL' dealt with retrospectively. If during the course of 
litigation it develops that the questions originally in 
controversy between the parties are no longer in issue, the 
case should be dismissed. 
POINT I 
Public officials convicted of crimes involving 
dishonesty and moral turpitude may be removed 
from office pursuant to 77-7-1 Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953) as amended, even if the crimes were 
cormnitted prior to taking office. 
Where more than one legal basis for a cause of 
action is in issue, and one is decided which is determinative 
of the case, the second is moot and need not and should not be 
decided. If it is found necessary to address the entire issue 
as presented by the appellant, it should be observed that the 
purpose of a removal statute, as stated in People vs. Hale, 42 
Ca R. 533, D. Ct. of Appeals, California (1965) • 
••• does not test whether a county officer has 
been a good man or a bad man as proved in a 
preceding term. It only determines whether by 
reason of existing facts and circumstances he 
should be removed from his present office • 
••• if an official commits a crime in connection 
with the operation of his office, or wilfully or 
corruptly fails or refuses to carry out a duty 
prescribed by the law or by the charter, if any, 
under which he holds his position, or if his 
conduct as such officer is below the standard of 
decency rightfully expected of a public official 
••• he may be removed from his office as the 
result of an accusation. pp. 537,538. 
-7-
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The Florida Supreme Court has framed the rule in 
State ex rel Turner vs. Earl ,295 So. 2d 609 (1974) as 
follows: 
••• we find that the rule supported by the great 
weight of authority and specifically adopted by 
this Court in construing statutory and constitu-
tional provisions authorizing the removal of 
public officers guilty of misconduct when such 
provisions do not refer to the term of office in 
which the misconduct occurred is that a public 
official may not be removed from off ice for mis-
conduct which he committed in another public 
off ice or in a prior term of off ice in the 
absence of disqualification to hold office 
in the future because of such misconduct. P.613 
The Utah Constitution (1896) Art. IV, Section 6 does 
provide for disqualification from holding public office for 
persons convicted of crimes, but only for treason, or for 
offenses against elective franchise. The Utah removal statute 
makes no reference to the term of office for which the mis-
conduct must occur. The case must be stronger still where the 
offense did not occur in connection with any public office, 
such as the case here on review. The provisions of Utah Law 
suggest no reason not to apply the great weight of authority 
cited by the Florida Court. 
Two of the cases cited by the appellant, PeoEle ex 
rel Tabor ski vs. Illinois AEEellate Court, 278 N.E. 2d 796, 
and State ex rel ZemEel vs. Twitchell, 367 P2d. 985, involve 
the question of State constitutional provisions and statutes 
for forfeiture of office for conviction and sentencing for 
felony. There is no such provision in Utah law, by statute or 
by constitutional provision. 
-8-
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Former Utah Statutory Law once provided for forfeiL-
urc of off ice upon conviction and sentence for a felony, 
Section 76-1-36, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended, but 
the statute was repealed, Section 76-10-1401, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended. 
There is no Utah public policy to warrant one to 
imply a constructive unfittness for office as suggested by the 
appellant under the holding of State vs. Stavar, 578 P2d 847. 
With the repeal of Section 77-7-1, all meaning has been with-
drawn from the Stavar holding. 
ed that an office should be 
If the legislature had intend-
forfeited upon conviction of 
crime, it could have passed a statute to that end. The mean-
ing and purpose of a removal statute should not be construed 
to do indirectly what the legislature has refused to do 
directly. The fact of conviction of crime, in itself, has no 
significance to Section 77-6-1 as presently enacted. 
As to the other cases cited by the appellant for 
removal for prior acts, all involve a situation for misconduct 
done in a prior term of the same public office from which 
removal is sought. The opinions all represent a minority 
exception to the rule stated in State ex rel Turner vs. Earle, 
Supra. None of them fit the facts of this case where there is 
!!2_ misconduct in any term of office. cf. Application of 
Baker, 386 NY S 2d 313; Attorney General vs. Tufts, 131 NE 2d 
573, 132 NE 2d 322; Bolton vs. Tully 158 A. 805; Hawkins vs. 
-9-
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Common Council, City of Grand Rapids, 158 NW 953; In the 
matter of Corwin 218 NY S 2d 718; State ex rel Douglas vs. 
Megaarden, 88 NW 412; State ex rel Longerholm vs. Schroeder, 
430 P 2d 304 None are directly in point as to the issue at 
hand. 
Probably the most direct reference to the issue in 
this case is illustrated by Note 6, P. 614-615 of the Florida 
Courts Opinion in State ex rel Turner vs. Earle, Supra, 
quoting from a Congressional Committee Report: 
" ••• it hardly could have been the intendment of 
the constitution that an officer could be 
impeached for a crime committed by him before 
his entry into the off ice from which he is to 
be removed because if this were so, there is no 
constitutional, and thus far, no legal limit-
ation as to the time during which he may be held 
so amenable to such impeachment ••• 
••• who will then dare assert that for offenses 
committed ten years ago, yes, five years or one 
year ago, before the election of a member the 
House has power to expel! at its caprice ••• 
The Utah Constitution (1896) Art. VI Section 21 
contemplates removal for cause in a manner similar to impeach-
ment. The current removal statute presumes nothing from 
conviction for an offense committed outside of public office 
and at ,a time prior to holding public office. 
CONCLUSION 
To remand for trial under a procedure that does not 
exist would be futile. The appeal should be dismissed. 
Should the Court reach the points raised by the appellant, on 
-10-
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the bas is of the argument and supporting case law, the order 
of the trial court dismissing the accusation should be 
affirmed. 
-11-
Respectfully Submitted 
DALE E. STRATFORD 
Attorney for Respondent 
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